The post Opening Remarks by NTI Co-Chair and CEO, Ernest J. Moniz at the Virtual Symposium of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) appeared first on International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament.
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Thank you, Michael and Undersecretary Jenkins, for those remarks, and thanks to all of our speakers and everyone in the audience today who is joining in support of this activity. NTI is honored to co–host this symposium with our partners at the Department of State and very pleased to participate in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification—IPNDV. We look forward to showcasing the truly innovative, groundbreaking work that the members have been doing together over the past six years.
We’ll hear from a diverse set of experts who have been leading the Partnership’s work on these verification challenges.
As Undersecretary Jenkins mentioned, the IPNDV began in 2014 when the U.S. Department of State announced that the U.S. government would lead an effort focused on bringing countries together to wrestle with the challenges of multilateral nuclear disarmament verification. The IPNDV’s work builds on and complements previous verification and monitoring initiatives, but it is unique.
- It involves states with and without nuclear weapons, as has been said – this is not uncontroversial at times, but it is key to charting a path for verification that will be trusted and sustainable.
- It incorporates technology at the beginning – speaking from experience, technical and policy perspectives don’t just compliment each other, but our approaches are more effective when these areas are intertwined.
- And it builds global capacity – More involvement in the substance means better policymaking, and it makes it more likely we will share a common understanding of how to reach our goals.
Those are core ideas behind IPNDV. The question on the table is: Is it working? Have we proved the hypothesis that brought the group together in 2014? I think
the answer is yes, we are making important progress, but we need to understand the collective response.
The bottom line is that the IPNDV is not just identifying the challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification, it is developing a toolbox of potential solutions to address them.
During its first two years of work, the IPNDV identified 14 key steps in the nuclear weapons dismantlement lifecycle. Then, the Partners focused their analytical work on the most sensitive and complicated steps associated with monitoring the physical dismantlement of a warhead.
The Partners made a key judgment from this phase of work: While tough challenges remain, verified nuclear dismantlement is possible while also managing safety, security, and non–proliferation concerns. This was not a foregone conclusion at the beginning of our work, and it remains a touchstone for our efforts going forward.
Where the first phase of work identified a conceptual path forward, the second phase explored more detailed concepts, technologies, and procedures. The IPNDV effectively moved from “paper to practice” through a series of exercises and technology demonstrations. Such practical activities are the focus of this morning’s panel discussion.
Now in its third phase of work, the IPNDV is refining the verification toolkit, focusing on processes, procedures, techniques, and technologies. Partners are finding creative ways to engage, moving all the work to a virtual setting due to the COVID–19 pandemic. Nevertheless, two virtual disarmament verification exercises were successfully coordinated over the past year.
IPNDV partners have always recognized that this work is one piece of a larger puzzle. Throughout this process, Partners have engaged with other experts and groups addressing nuclear disarmament verification, including the UN Group of Governmental Experts. The IPNDV also published major technical and analytical products ahead of the planned 2020 NPT Review Conference. Tomorrow, this meeting will conclude with a discussion about how the IPNDV’s work fits into the broader context of disarmament.
Just as it has for all of us, the pandemic has affected how IPNDV partners work. Partners once met in person three times a year but shifted to virtual settings—sometimes at odd and inconvenient hours for various global participants. But the momentum has been maintained throughout these challenging times. I want to personally thank all of the IPNDV researchers, experts and diplomats for their hard work and commitment. I know all of us look forward to the time when meetings are again in–person.
This partnership has a strong future, built on active and engaged participation. Many individuals and countries have played key roles in the development of the goals and objectives of IPNDV, particularly colleagues from Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who have co–chaired working groups.
I’d also like to recognize the governments of Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands for providing critical funding over the years to support the IPNDV’s work and outreach.
Despite the progress, we still have a lot of work to do. Together, we’ll continue to answer some very tough questions, build and diversify international capacity and expertise, and be poised for a future when we are monitoring and verifying nuclear weapons reductions.
Thank you.
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]]>The post Opening Remarks by Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie Jenkins (T) at the Virtual Symposium of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) appeared first on International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament.
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Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you all for attending this Virtual Symposium of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), and further thanks to my colleagues in the AVC Bureau and Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) for coordinating and hosting it for us. I am excited to speak to you today about the critical work done by the IPNDV and am looking forward to gaining further insights from our wonderful panelists and experts over the next two days. It is heartening to know that even during the difficult conditions we have all endured during the ongoing pandemic, the Partnership’s consummate professionals have continued its valuable work.
As many of you know, the U.S. Department of State, in collaboration with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, created the Partnership more than six years ago to foster collaborative engagement between states on the considerable technical challenges associated with verifying nuclear disarmament. The IPNDV’s ongoing work includes identifying these challenges and potential technologies and procedures to address them. The Partnership has become a model for how to bring together states with divergent viewpoints to tackle some of the trickiest and most persistent challenges associated with future nuclear disarmament verification. This includes those with nuclear weapons and those without, NPT and non–NPT states, and several P5 states. Finding mutually understood solutions that ensure future nuclear disarmament can be credibly verified is essential to achieving any future reductions.
A previous description of the IPNDV as “blue collar diplomacy” remains quite apt. It is a practical tool that could be used to overcome obstacles to further progress on nuclear disarmament. The work being done within the Partnership requires us all to put away the talking points and prepared speeches and work together to develop real solutions to the challenges we all face. The United States and its partners have turned to initiatives like the IPNDV to try and identify ways to improve the international security environment. We should all be proud of the efforts we have made in furthering nuclear disarmament. These are not half–measures or empty gestures, but practical proposals.
By identifying avenues toward further progress on nuclear disarmament verification, the IPNDV also provides valuable contributions to the NPT. Looking forward to the delayed 10th NPT RevCon early next year, and recalling the 50th anniversary of the treaty’s entry into force, we should positively reflect on the NPT’s contribution to international peace and security. The NPT has made the world safer and more prosperous. Having the rock–solid foundation of the NPT and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime makes every country more secure, and that is one of the essential factors that enables progress on nuclear disarmament. We must reaffirm our commitments to the NPT and
rededicate ourselves to preserve and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime for future generations.
The next two days of this Symposium will serve as an important platform for our esteemed panelists and experts to expand upon the substantial progress the Partnership has made its work over the last several years. Our, progress is all the more impressive in light of the challenges presented by the last eighteen months of continuing pandemic restrictions.
I thank you all very much for attending, and for the opportunity to speak here today. I am greatly looking forward to seeing first–hand the great work being done by the IPNDV, and to reviewing the reports and products resulting from your work.
Thank you and please enjoy the Symposium!
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]]>The post Statement from Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the U.S. Department of Energy and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration on the work of the IPNDV appeared first on International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament.
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I hope this message finds everybody safe and healthy. I regret that the necessary precautions to fight the COVID-19 pandemic meant that we were unable to meet in person to celebrate the IPNDV’s accomplishments and share ideas for moving forward with this important initiative. Ironically, the IPNDV provides an example of how nations can successfully pool resources and expertise towards addressing a common problem, and I am confident that this type of cooperation will enable us to overcome the threat posed by the pandemic.
Although some challenging days may still lay ahead, I remain optimistic that we will be able to come together again soon.
As we wait for that day to arrive, the important work of nuclear disarmament verification must proceed, and it is an honor to provide this statement on behalf of the United States regarding the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. I’d like to thank all of the IPNDV partners, the U.S. Department of State, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative for all of your dedication and hard work in coordinating this initiative and commend you on the beginning of Phase III of the Partnership.
It is encouraging to see that, despite the turbulent times in which we are living, there is still a strong desire to seek further understanding of the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament and to identify potential solutions to those challenges. I’d like to briefly focus on three things in this statement:
- The importance of nuclear disarmament verification in a challenging international environment;
- The benefits of collaboration, both to the National Nuclear Security Administration and between nuclear and non- nuclear weapons states; and
- The future of the IPNDV as it moves into Phase III of its work.
The Importance of Disarmament Verification
With regard to my first point about the importance of disarmament verification, when I say “turbulent times,” in addition to the current pandemic, I’m referring to the current pessimism that seems to pervade analysis of the international arms control regime. A recent article in Foreign Affairs asked: “Is a New Nuclear Age Upon Us?” A week later, a headline in The Atlantic definitively declared: “A New Nuclear Era Is Coming.” In August, again in Foreign Affairs, another article gloomily proclaimed: “The Return of Doomsday.”
While I may not agree with all of the arguments laid out in these articles, I think we all agree that arms control measures can provide improved predictability and increased transparency, constrain certain destabilizing weapons, and enhance stability.
Hence, the United States is committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner security – and efforts that include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations. This is why the Trump administration is committed to supporting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of this Treaty this year.
The key to negotiating and implementing successful arms control agreements, however, is ensuring that they are verifiable and enforceable.
This is why the U.S. Department of State, in partnership with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, established the IPNDV more than five years ago. If verification is a necessary precursor to any effective future nuclear disarmament agreement, then collaboration between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states is vital to building the capacity needed to develop and implement effective verification. This is especially true given that attaining the disarmament objectives we seek to achieve likely will require some of the most intrusive monitoring and verification challenges ever encountered to date.
The U.S. Government firmly believes the IPNDV can help to identify the key challenges likely to accompany such future agreements. Indeed, the importance of the Partnership’s mission was clearly expressed in the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which stated unequivocally: “The United States remains committed to finding long-term solutions to the technical challenges of verifying nuclear reductions, and therefore will explore new concepts and approaches for this goal, including continued support for the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.”
Thus far, I think our investment in the Partnership is bearing fruit.
Throughout the two phases of the Partnership’s work, dozens of experts from partner countries have developed more than 50 reports, papers, and technical assessments. These products are vital to the efforts to develop verification mechanisms for future nuclear disarmament, and help to create a common language, trust, and understanding in a spirit of collaboration between possessor and non-possessor states.
Moreover, the collaborative nature of the IPNDV has created an atmosphere in which government experts can come together, forgo the formalities of prepared statements and talking points, and conduct the hard work that is “blue collar diplomacy.” As we saw in Phase II with the Franco-German NuDiVe exercise, the Partnership’s planning and execution of exercises and demonstrations can stimulate new ideas and understandings.
NNSA, the IPNDV, and the Benefits of Collaboration
As to my second point, highlighting the benefits of collaboration, let me begin by taking a step back to address a basic question: Where does my organization, the National Nuclear Security Administration, fit into all of this?
For those of you who may not be familiar with NNSA, we were established by Congress in 2000, with three enduring missions:
- Ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile;
- Reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and
- Providing nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines.
Although we are celebrating our 20th anniversary, NNSA’s heritage can be traced back to the Manhattan Project and the Atomic Energy Commission. While maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent is NNSA’s mainstay, we are the inheritors of a long tradition of developing technology for arms control monitoring and verification, and maintain a significant program for research, development, testing, and evaluation.
Together with our partner national security laboratories, plants, and sites, NNSA possesses unparalleled scientific and technical expertise that plays a vitally important role in confirming treaty compliance and, in other cases, denuclearization. To borrow a line from the director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Dr. Thom Mason, sometimes “only a weapons lab can recognize a weapons lab.”
NNSA research focuses on developing and assessing capabilities that balance potential verification requirements with operational and security considerations, while engaging with outside partners from both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon states to benefit from their experience and perspectives. Moreover, NNSA has supported the Partnership since its inception. In Phase I, an NNSA expert co-chaired the Technical Challenges and Solutions Working Group, and in Phase II that same expert co-chaired the Technologies for Verification Working Group. Both working groups investigated technologies, methods, and procedures that could be used for specific technical challenges in the nuclear dismantlement process.
The United States and the technical experts at NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites are fully supportive of continuing these activities during Phase III of the Partnership. The IPNDV continues to demonstrate that collaboration between States with and without nuclear weapons can lead to real, tangible progress in the field of nuclear disarmament verification.
As a technical agency, we understand that this collaboration is critical to future success for several reasons. First, it allows us to build on our domestic research and development efforts.
Second, this collaboration produces a deeper consideration of a broader range of potential perspectives, verification objectives, and solutions to complex disarmament problems.
Third, these collaborations have been instrumental in advancing research and fostering new, creative thinking about technology development that the Partners have undertaken outside of the IPNDV.
For example, the idea for the Portal Monitor for Authentication and Certification, was a result of lessons learned through a U.S.-UK exercise. This joint exercise highlighted the challenges associated with the use of technology for nuclear verification. Specifically, it furthered our understanding of how easy or challenging it can be to certify a technology for use in a nuclear facility, and how easy it is to deploy, while balancing the need for information protection.
Inspired by the exercise, U.S. and UK experts had a vision for modular, easy-to-deploy radiation detection equipment with simple electronics that would protect sensitive information. Five-and- a-half years later, in 2019, a joint U.S.-UK team demonstrated the PMAC at the Pantex Plant.
Of course, no single technology, or group of technologies, will ever be the “silver bullet” for verifiable warhead dismantlement. We must continue to think creatively and realistically about how technologies could be deployed as part of future nuclear disarmament activities.
Phase III and the IPNDV
The third area I want to highlight is the IPNDV’s future as the Partnership moves into Phase III. The hands-on activities, practical exercises, and technology demonstrations will continue to inspire creative thinking and new ways to look at enduring problems.
The diverse group within the Partnership incorporates a broader range of potential perspectives, verification objectives, and solutions to solve complex disarmament problems. The United States recognizes that non-nuclear weapon states have significant expertise and experience to help tackle technical challenges with nuclear disarmament verification, including expertise in nuclear physics, nuclear energy facilities, IAEA inspections, and monitoring and verification in non-nuclear contexts, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Complex technical challenges remain, and states without nuclear weapons can help resolve these through the advanced technical capabilities you offer, drawing from a range of technical expertise and industry. Partnerships like the IPNDV provide the right forum for excellent collaboration, and I encourage continued participation and leadership in these endeavors.
It is also critical to future collaborative verification work that states without nuclear weapons develop as strong an understanding as possible of the balance that states with nuclear weapons must maintain to provide the appropriate confidence building information on the one hand, while guarding against proliferation and assuring information security on the other, all while adhering to our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments.
Over the course of Phase III, the Partnership should seek to complement other nuclear disarmament verification initiatives, such as the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership and the U.S.-UK verification initiatives, future United Nations groups, such as the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, and the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative.
Not only can the Partnership supplement the important work of these other initiatives, but partner states can engage other non-traditional stakeholders – for example, NGOs and universities – to take on the challenge of monitoring nuclear disarmament verification.
The United States, through NNSA, will continue to support this important work so we have the best tools and techniques available to enable verifiable arms control when future security conditions permit.
Conclusion
As I conclude, I acknowledge the prospect that, despite the aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, we must take the world as it is, not as we wish it were. This is why I firmly believe there is no contradiction between the desire to reduce the number of nuclear weapons with continuing efforts to strengthen America’s nuclear deterrent. For 75 years, the effectiveness and credibility of America’s nuclear weapons capability has reassured friends and allies; contributed to international stability during the Cold War; and kept Americans safe from nuclear attack.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has led the world in reducing our nuclear stockpile while increasing transparency. While we reduced the number and types of nuclear weapons in our arsenal, other countries chose a different course and continued to modernize and expand their strategic capabilities. That is also why the United States must develop capabilities to deny potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and our allies.
The NNSA’s weapons modernization programs do not seek parity with other countries’ arsenals, or to start a new arms race. Instead, we are pursuing a qualitative and comprehensive approach towards maintaining a viable deterrent for the future at a time of increasing, and increasingly diverse, threats. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the U.S. nuclear umbrella provides and increase the likelihood of conflict.
If we are ever to achieve the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons, or perhaps more realistically, to reinvigorate momentum toward achieving a world with fewer nuclear weapons, it must begin with producing tangible solutions to the technical challenges of verifying nuclear reductions. This is why the United States fully supports the work of the Partnership, and we look forward to applying our expertise in the serious, substantive work of the Partnership as it addresses challenges to future nuclear disarmament verification.
Once again, thank you all for your commitment to this important mission.
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]]>Director of the Security Policy Department of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the IPNDV Working Group Meeting
20 June 2019, Utrecht
Very happy to be here for the final plenary session of the IPNDV Joint Working Group Meeting in Utrecht.
As I understand, much work has been done over these three days in the different working groups, and I hope that this meeting has been a useful step in settling on the outcomes of Phase 2 of the IPNDV
You have heard much from my colleagues about history this week, so I will focus a little bit on the future during this closing plenary.
After all, Utrecht is thanks to its history an inspirational city, as you were told. But also an aspirational city. NL won Eurovision songfestival, Utrecht ambition to hold the Eurovision songfestival in 2020. As you know the competitors are judged by an expert jury and by the public at large. The same is true for IPNDV.
Very glad to see the focus on different exercises and walkthroughs here at the meeting. IPNDV work can be difficult to understand, or highly abstract/conceptual in nature.
But initiatives such as the French/German exercise in Julich, where participants focus on a very specific step in the dismantlement process, will hopefully help us to achieve more tangible results.
So I would encourage you, when you discuss your plans for the third Phase of IPNDV, to really focus on possibilities for practical work. What exercises could be important to test all the models that IPNDV has developed so far? What scenario, or scenarios, could be used for walkthroughs and simulations that could help us think of new verification models and regimes?
We have also tried to contribute in this sense, by asking our applied sciences research center TNO to dive into detection methods for high explosives. I hope many of you will attend the demonstration tomorrow, and I hope that it will be useful.
I would also encourage you, in your outlook on Phase 3, to be ambitious, and to really keep in mind the question of outreach.
IPNDV is a success, but we have to keep moving forward and set goals that challenge ourselves.
And, we need to be able to tell the wider disarmament community what we are doing, and get their support. We have to keep our eyes on the wider context of our work here, especially the context of the NPT.
We consider IPNDV, and verification in general, a crucial element of the implementation of our NPT commitments. But we also need to be able to convince those countries that are not in this room of that.
That means going to those countries with our results and achievements, and asking for their feedback. It also means that we listen to what they tell us about our products, and perhaps even find more ways to involve them in some of the IPNDV activities such as exercises.
Let me conclude by reiterating that it is a pleasure to have you all here. On behalf of NL I would thank you all for making the journey to Utrecht – some from really far – and to making this meeting a success.
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]]>Deputy Director-General for Political Affairs, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the IPNDV Working Group Meeting
18 June 2019, Utrecht
Ladies and gentlemen,
- Let me start by welcoming you all to the Netherlands for this joint working group meeting of the IPNDV. We are proud to host this important meeting, the last one before the plenary that will conclude the second phase of the partnership.
- I would like to extend a special welcome to the colleagues from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the US State Department, who have created the partnership and were of great help in setting this meeting up.
- Let me also extend a special welcome to those that came from far away, especially the colleagues from Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, and the Philippines. We really appreciate you coming from that far.
- We decided to host you in the city of Utrecht this week. I hope you will enjoy the historic surroundings that the city provides. There are two parts of its history that deserve mentioning here in particular.
- You are currently in the “Pope’s Home”. It was built by Adrian Boeyens, who was a bishop form Utrecht. Or rather: he commissioned it in 1517. At that point, Adrian was serving at the court of Charles V in Spain. But before he could return to this house, he was elected as the only Dutch Pope in history and went to Rome. That’s where he died a year later. So he never got to even see this house.
- Second, this is the city where the Treaty of Utrecht was signed in 1713. This ended the Spanish War of Succession. It also marked the decline of the power of the Dutch Republic, where the negotiations were held. As the French Ambassador told the Dutch: « nous traiterons sur vous, chez vous, sans vous ». We are negotiating about you, in your country, and without you.
- I am not mentioning these parts of history for nothing. They actually hold important lessons, even for the IPNDV. But I will get back to that.Ladies and gentlemen,
- Nuclear disarmament is a foreign policy priority for the Netherlands. We fully support the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. And we keep actively working towards that.
- Our government has repeatedly reaffirmed its dedication to this goal. Especially now, when the international security and stability face serious threats.
- Of course, I do not need to tell you that times are tough in the world of arms control and disarmament. But indulge me for a moment while I do so anyway.
- Relations between major nuclear powers have worsened while the role of nuclear weapons in international rhetoric has increased.
- The JCPOA is under strain.
- The Russian violations of the INF are leading to the demise of this treaty, which has made a great contribution to security and peace in Europe.
- Very few nuclear arms control instruments remain; New START may be the last constraint on strategic arsenals.
- The DPRK has not ceased its missile-related activities, nor has it shown any inclination towards denuclearization.
- And the picture is bleak in relation to other WMD, too. Chemical weapons were used in attacks in the UK and in Syria. Impunity for the perpetrators of those attacks threatens to erode crucial international norms.
- I am not reminding you of this simply in an attempt to ruin your day. But I would like to remind you how important it is that we keep trying to make progress in terms of nuclear arms control and disarmament.
- And working on verification is really one of the most important parts of that. It will be an essential part of future nuclear disarmament agreements. It creates trust between countries. And it helps to build habits of cooperation between experts, diplomats, and military establishments.
- That’s why IPNDV is integral to the nuclear disarmament process. It is one of the few areas where meaningful progress is being made and can be made in the foreseeable future.So, ladies and gentlemen,
- Let’s not take the IPNDV for granted. The initiative will end its second phase this year. So it is time to start thinking about how to move ahead. About how to ensure the IPNDV will continue to be an important part of the nuclear disarmament landscape.
- One of the challenges before you is how to make sure that the sometimes very technical work of the IPNDV is understandable and comprehensible to the people outside this room, not just to those in it.
- NTI does great work in this regard with the website and infographics. But the work of IPNDV is complicated stuff that diplomats, decision-makers, ministers and parliamentarians often have difficulties to grasp. That impacts the effectiveness of IPNDV.
- So we should think about how to communicate what we do even better. How to do outreach, and how to ensure that the NPT community understands the crucial role of our work in the process of implementing article VI of the treaty.
- When considering the next years of the IPNDV, I would therefore like to encourage you to think about specific results and outcomes for the IPNDV that would help those efforts.
- Aside from the excellent papers and reports, how can IPNDV contribute to the nuclear disarmament process? How do we get from conceptual and technical work to tangible options and solutions that could be of direct use to future negotiators? This is where the first history lesson comes in. Do not let the work of the IPNDV become a Pope’sHome, that we will never see in real life, in practice.
- Exercises, simulations, and scenario-based work will be important to do so. That’s why I’m glad to see all the valuable work of the IPNDV in this area, especially yesterday’s walk through exercise and the French-German NuDiVe exercise in September.
- I encourage you all to discuss this week on how to further build on these excellent initiatives.
- And to consider how to expand IPNDV’s reach a little further. The IPNDV must remain an inclusive and diverse group if we want to maximize its political impact. How can we engage countries that aren’t part of IPNDV but may want to be? And can we make a serious attempt to bring Russia and China back into the IPNDV? This is the second lesson from Utrecht’s history. We should not let the IPNDV become “sur vous, chez vous, sans vous ».
- Most importantly, in continuing the valuable work of the IPNDV, stay ambitious. Realism is important in our work, but you must be bold in setting your goals for the next phase of the IPNDV. Even though IPNDV does not negotiate any treaty, it should inspire those who do.
- So let me finish up by thanking you once again for all your work so far, by thanking you for travelling to the Netherlands to continue your work here, and most of all by wishing you all good luck this week.
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]]>delegations have accepted our invitation to participate in this Joint Working Group Meeting of the
International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. We are very delighted and honoured to
host this meeting.
The Partnership is entering its fifth year of action. The clear progress and impressive results achieved
during the past four years stand as proof of the value of the collaborative engagement between states
with and without nuclear weapons. This collaboration serves a very good purpose and there are obvious
reasons to continue the Partnership. Let us keep up the good work!
We live in a perilous world. Big power competition seems to be increasing and intensifying. The rules
based international order is challenged in multiple ways. Hard won fundamentals and well-established
norms are breaking down either by design or as collateral damage. Unpredictability is the buzzword
used to describe today’s international politics.
For smaller countries, and I count Finland to be one, these are arduous times. How do you best promote
your own interests and improve regional and global stability in this kind of a world? One obvious answer
is through collaborative partnerships, like the IPNDV.
International arms control and disarmament are in a particularly bad shape. The Russian noncompliance with the INF-Treaty and the subsequent announcement by the United States of withdrawing from the Treaty are a well-known case in point. Nevertheless, there is more to the dismal state of arms control, like the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria and even in Europe, as well as the prevailing problems with the conventional arms control in Europe. In addition, there has not been any progress in getting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into force and starting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. This is surely not a springtime for arms control.
In a world of escalating tensions, lessened trust and malfunctioning international instruments, the importance of IPNDV and similar initiatives only increase. Even when the work in the IPNDV is considered technical, it serves also a very positive political purpose.
In this respect, I want to mention also the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. Although the focus of the GGE is different from the IPNDV, it also highlight the importance the international community puts on developing means of verification as a way of promoting nuclear arms control and disarmament.
Verification is and will be a key ingredient of taking nuclear disarmament forward. The IPNDV achieved
great results in the Phase I addressing the very complex challenge of monitoring and verifying the
physical dismantlement of a nuclear weapon. Phase II of the Partnership will build on the results and will
focus on the verification of nuclear weapons declarations and reductions as well as identify and
demonstrate a select number of key verification technologies identified in Phase I.
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]]>The post Remarks from NTI Vice President Corey Hinderstein at the IPNDV 6th Plenary appeared first on International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament.
]]>IPNDV 6th Plenary Meeting – London, United Kingdom
Opening Session – December 4, 2018
(As prepared)
Thank you to our hosts, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, for having us here. And thank you again to all of our participants, for your continued support and dedication.
As we meet here at the halfway point of Phase II, this is a critical time to do everything we can to ensure the successful outcome of this work and set ourselves up for a next phase.
Conveniently, those two goals are linked—and our homework starts now. I have three taskings for all in the room as we begin our week together: communicate, engage, and support. All three of these are linked together:
- We need to continue to communicate the value and importance of IPNDV both the process and the content we are creating together. Both sides of that coin are important. The end of phase deliverables should show the international community, and our own governments and leadership, the importance of this international, multi-governmental collaborative forum working in support of disarmament and arms control objectives. We are getting work done that is new, relevant, practical, and substantive. Our outreach challenge is clear and all of you are the best advocates. We want to continue to raise the profile of IPNDV, particularly among our political leaders.
- Our second task is to engage. Within your systems, I encourage you to start preparing now for the end of phase II in December 2019. This is not a partnership of the co-conveners, the U.S. Department of State and NTI, nor of the co-chairs. Please engage with other partners and seek the involvement of everyone in the room, because we need contributions from all. Diversity of input will lead us to better outcomes. We know not all participants can be regularly engaged in our work, but it is not too late to make a big contribution. As you, or your leadership, meet with counterparts in other IPNDV states, please include talking points that demonstrate why this partnership is worth your time and their active support.
- The third task is support. I encourage you to continue seeking political support to sustain the IPNDV’s ongoing work, and if you can, consider financially supporting the Partnership, now and into Phase III. But support can come in other ways too, such as providing necessary staff time, and attending meetings, exercises, tech demos, and outreach events. Additionally, we are very grateful to our hosts, because we recognize the time and resources that hosting requires. And lastly, I would be remiss to not mention NTI. We support the Partnership in many ways, including financially, and we have to raise our own money in order to do so. We do not accept U.S. Government funding to keep our independence. I want to thank our colleagues from Canada and the Netherlands for their financial support of NTI and this Partnership.
In conclusion, we seek to have the most impact possible from Phase II and to set up a meaningful and ambitious agenda for Phase III. I believe the IPNDV is the most successful international engagement currently working in the disarmament space. We can continue our momentum and success if we keep communicating the importance and the value of the partnership, engaging our leaders, the other partners, and the broader community, and gaining the political and budgetary support to maintain this Partnership.
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]]>Director-General for Nonproliferation and Nuclear Affairs at the IPNDV Working Group Meeting
10 July 2018, Seoul
Ladies and gentlemen,
Welcome to Seoul and thank you for coming all the way. It is my great pleasure to see all of you, verification experts, gathering in Seoul. I also thank the Department of State and Nuclear Threat Initiative for all the efforts made for this working group meeting.
I remember the meeting at the US Mission in New York in 2015 in the margin of the NPT Review Conference to discuss the launch of International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). Since then, I have been apart from the disarmament circle for last few years. Today, I am very pleased to see the progress of the discussion that day.
As the 2020 NPT Review cycle goes on, to some extent, pessimism seems to prevail. In general, the conditions for the successful Review Conference are not so favorable. Recently we hear more frequently about the deteriorating security environment and strategic instability and about the rising risk of misperception and miscalculation. The situation in the Middle East has not improved, the future of New START is uncertain. States Parties to the NPT are divided over disarmament and regional issues.
However we cannot afford to sit down and simply wait until things start looking up, because they will never be, without our common efforts to find breakthroughs. Given the current atmosphere even small but concrete breakthroughs can make a difference and that is where I find the value and strength of IPNDV.
Article VI of NPT notes that future disarmament shall be conducted under strict and effective international control, for which verification is a key. Article VI also implies that the disarmament is not a sole responsibility of nuclear weapon states but a co-work of both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.
In this regard, we consider multilateral verification of nuclear weapons dismantlement is a process which, if we tackle with common wisdom, can make progress in building greater confidence among states with diverging views.
During the Phase I, we concluded that it is possible for states with and without nuclear weapons to work together in the verification process. The way ahead is to translate these possibilities into concrete steps. In this light, my government firmly supports the work of IPNDV. I am also confident that deliverables of the Phase II will become invaluable contributions to the 2020 Review Conference.
Ladies and gentlemen,
I am sure that the three-day meeting will bear a fruitful outcome. At the same time cultural experience is unforgettable elements of mutual understanding. I hope you find time to look around the city. Seoul has been a political and economic center of this country for more than six centuries. If you walk out from the hotel, you will see our national treasure, Dongdaemun (the East Gate). Dongdaemun is one of four main gates entering the City, of which only two are preserved until today. Also you can easily get to royal palaces, national museum or galleries by public transportation. Please enjoy your staying in Seoul.
To conclude with, I wish you all the success. Thank you. /END/
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]]>The post Remarks at the IPNDV Side Event at the 2018 NPT PrepCom by Jens Wirstam appeared first on International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament.
]]>Remarks by Jens Wirstam
Deputy Research Director, Swedish Defence Research Agency and Co-Chair of IPNDV Working Group 6
The IPNDV is a technical and practical cooperation between Nuclear and Non-nuclear Weapon States, aiming to create a set of tools for designing and verifying future nuclear disarmament treaties. Today, I will highlight a few of the main results from the first phase of this work of IPNDV, a phase that ended in December last year.
At the very start, the Partnership created an analytic framework of nuclear weapon dismantlement-related activities that led to a 14-step process from deployment to the disposition of the nuclear weapon components. It does not assume that the process necessarily has to start at Step 1; it could start at any point in the process. And in reality, dismantlement will in all likelihood start at different steps, depending on the operational status of each individual nuclear warhead slated for dismantlement. This circumstance in itself will shape your verification strategy, since warheads that are initiated at different stages in this 14-step process are available for a different number, and different types, of verification measures. This affects the context of each separate verification activity.
This 14-step process for dismantlement does not represent all possible steps, or processes, in a Nuclear Weapon Lifecycle. Thus, it does not pretend to represent all activities in nuclear disarmament verification in general; the dismantlement process is a subset. Even so, during the very earliest stage of Phase I, we in the Partnership recognized that we had to focus on a subset of the dismantlement process. We therefore decided to focus on the actual dismantlement of a nuclear weapon, corresponding to steps 6-10, something we labelled “The Basic Dismantlement Scenario.” By this we mean that we do not assume that there has been previous verification activities upstream (before step 6), and secondly that dismantlement is the separation of fissile material and high explosives from an intact nuclear warhead containing these two materials together. You can imagine other definitions for what constitutes dismantlement; this definition was chosen based on the fact that fissile material and high explosives together is what you have in order to initiate a nuclear detonation. And the reason for focussing on these particular steps, number 6-10, is that the dismantlement is obviously at the core of going from a nuclear weapon to something that is not a nuclear weapon, so it is a very important process. At the same time, it is also a very complex and technically challenging process. Why? Well, because the inspectors need confidence that a nuclear weapon in fact was dismantled, while there is a simultaneous stringent need to protect proliferation-sensitive information and also meet safety and security requirements.
When the warhead arrives for dismantlement, the inspectors will first check against the declarations that are necessary to initiate monitoring or inspection activities (e.g. serial numbers, log records, etc.). Then inspectors could make technical measurements against some agreed characteristics, like presence of both weapons-usable nuclear material and relevant high explosives, to gain confidence that the object is a treaty accountable item. Finally, the inspectors put the item under chain of custody in order to be able to keep track of the object and any actions potentially affecting it (e.g. monitor the storage room). During the actual dismantlement, inspectors will unlikely be present for proliferation reasons but the facility or location used will be put under chain of custody to monitor everything that goes in or out. When the components, the fissile material and high explosives, have been separated, they will be transferred to temporary storage under chain of custody awaiting further steps towards disposition. During this step, technical measurements of the components take place, and here it will be necessary to, for example, measure both presence of weapons-usable material in the “nuclear material box” as well as absence of such material in the “high explosives box”, in order to be confident that all the fissile material is accounted for correctly. Note that these measurements could also make the initial measurements unnecessary, depending on factors such as the time interval related to the dismantlement process.
Thus, with the techniques and inspections just described, the following objectives in the Basic Dismantlement Scenario can be met. 1) Confirm that the warhead meets the agreed characteristics, i.e. that the object is a treaty accountable item. 2) Ensure chain of custody of the nuclear warhead. 3) Confirm the dismantlement of the warhead. And (4), ensure chain of custody of the different materials after dismantlement.
If you look at a more detailed level, each step can be subdivided into a number of different monitoring or inspection activities, and technologies or procedures options. So, for example, for the actual dismantlement step, you can look at both the entry and exit aspects, and list your options at each. For example, in addition to measuring your material boxes after dismantlement, you will likely also want to look for presence, or absence, of these materials in the dismantlement room – both before and after the dismantlement, to check that no nuclear material or high explosives were left there.
Unfortunately, my presentation cannot give justice to all the thinking that went into the work of the first phase of IPNDV, so I would really recommend visiting the IPNDV webpage, where you can find an interactive page (add link) and be able to dive into as much detail as you wish, or dare to – from the objectives all the way down to several pages of technical details for each specific technology option, across the whole Basic Dismantlement Scenario. It is a truly remarkable source of information.
Now, I should also point out that some residual verification uncertainties are unavoidable after one specific inspection. Therefore, verification of nuclear weapon dismantlement (such as the basic dismantlement scenario) should be seen as the result of many separate, mutually reinforcing, cumulative activities over time. Confidence levels depend not only on activities at a specific time and place, but also on how they fit in an overall context and in the consistency over time.
After this short overview of the Partnership’s work during Phase I, I think it is proper to end with the Partnership’s key judgement from Phase I: “While tough challenges remain, potentially applicable technologies, information barriers, and inspection procedures provide a path forward that should make possible multilaterally monitored nuclear warhead dismantlement while successfully managing safety, security, non-proliferation, and classification concerns in a future nuclear disarmament agreement.”
Thank you for your attention.
Accompanying Presentation: https://staging-ipndv-staging.kinsta.cloud/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/IPNDV-Phase-I-NPT-PrepCom-2018-Sweden.pdf
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]]>The post Remarks at the IPNDV Side Event at the 2018 NPT PrepCom by David Chambers appeared first on International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament.
]]>April 27, 2018
Remarks by David Chambers
Senior Principal Research Analyst
FCO, United Kingdom and Co-Chair of IPNDV Working Group 4
Good afternoon everybody. I will now give an overview of the plan of our work for Phase II of IPNDV, and say a little about how IPNDV fits together with other initiatives looking at disarmament verification. A more detailed programme of work for Phase II can be found on the IPNDV website IPNDV.org.
There are five overarching objectives for our work in Phase II: 1) to broaden the work of IPNDV to look at wider aspects of disarmament verification beyond the simple scenario we concentrated on in Phase I; 2) to deepen the work on verification, by looking in depth at certain key elements to ensure we can fulfil our third objective; 3) to develop practical and effective monitoring and verification options, only by looking in detail can we hope to create solutions which can give inspectors high confidence while protecting security, safety and proliferation sensitive information; 4) to undertake practical exercises and technology demonstrations, and I will say more on our plans in this area in few minutes, and finally and most importantly; 5) to undertake outreach activities to share the lessons learned within IPNDV as widely as possible, with technical, academic and policy audiences, such that we build capacity not just within IPNDV but in the widest possible communities.
Phase II will be a two year programme of work, to give the partnership time to undertake a significant body of work and produce substantive results, but to ensure it is not too long before we put pressure on ourselves to share those results more widely. We will of course keep sharing our findings during Phase II as and when we can. This timing will also fit with the current NPT review cycle, meaning we will be looking to end this current phase in time for its results to be shared at the NPT review conference in 2020. Much as in Phase I, we will have three working groups, so we can cover more ground than with only one group, but not spread ourselves too thinly. We will have a series of working group meetings each year, the first of which for Phase II was just a few weeks ago in Stockholm, ending with a plenary to review our work at the end of each year.
The choice of work for Phase II was done to logically build on the work undertaken in Phase I, and to tackle the initial elements that might be required to verify future nuclear disarmament. This already means we are aware of many crucial elements that will have to be tackled in future phases of IPNDV, particularly around elements of verification specifically related to the maintenance of a nuclear weapon free world. Indeed it is already clear that IPNDV will need to have many follow on phases to cover the breadth of work required.
The three working groups for Phase II will be: working group 4 on the verification of nuclear weapon declarations, co-chaired by the United Kingdom and Poland; working group 5 on the verification of reductions, co-chaired by Australia and the Netherlands; and working group 6 on the technologies for verification, co-chaired by the United States and Sweden. The United States and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) will of course continue to provide leadership and secretarial support for IPNDV throughout its ongoing work.
Working group 4 will focus on how to verify declarations of nuclear weapons. They will initially look at the role and objectives of declarations in nuclear disarmament, to understand the required timings, sequencing and informational requirements of such declarations, and to understand how declarations on weapons fits into the wider disarmament needs. They will then focus on initial weapon declarations, and how such declarations can be verified, taking into account if such declarations are of all the weapons in a state, or initially only of part of a weapons stockpile.
Verification of both the correctness and completeness of such declarations will be crucial parts of their work.
Working group 5 will focus on how to verify the reduction of a significant number of declared weapons. They will look at each of the 14 steps we identified in Phase I, to see what verification methods, tools and technologies can be applied at each step, as well as looking holistically at the entire process to understand how verification at each step builds confidence. Also by looking at the process as a whole, key steps and verification requirements can be identified so an efficient and practical verification regime can be built. This should also enable identification of specific key elements that can be studied in greater detail to develop effective and practical inspection methodologies which also take into account safety, security and non-proliferation. Consideration of how a regime is built and maintained over a significant period of time, and how this can build further confidence levels will be important.
Working group 6 will be a continuation of the work undertaken in Phase I by working group 3, focussing on the advancement of key verification technologies. These will include technologies to identify nuclear and explosive materials in containers, while protecting potentially proliferation sensitive information, and conforming to nuclear and explosive safety regulations. This will include aspects such as information barriers and how to build trust in equipment by both the host and inspectors. After all, only one side can provide such equipment, and how the other can be convinced it will produce the correct results and protect sensitive information is a fundamental requirement. The group will also look to undertake practical activities and to enable outreach demonstrations if possible.
As well as the three working groups, we have also begun to look at how we can undertake more practical activities within Phase II, and in Stockholm a further group met with members from all working groups to explore possible opportunities. This may include field or table top exercises, walk-through events or technology demonstrations. It is early days yet but this is something I am certainly looking forward to, and something that will add an exciting prospect of an interactive element to our work.
Finally I wanted to say a little about how IPNDV relates to other initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification. IPNDV is a technical initiative looking to develop practical and effective verification solutions, but it also brings together those from the policy and technical communities to discuss and understand the issues from a wide variety of perspectives. Previous and ongoing initiatives such as the UK-US, UK-Norway Initiative, and now the QUAD, which hopefully you will have heard more about yesterday at their side event, which involve a more limited number of States, have been able to focus on specific detailed elements of disarmament verification. Bringing together groups of technical experts from their States, has allowed greater in-depth study of specific technologies and methodologies. The work of these other initiatives is therefore highly complementary to IPNDV, and will continue to be so. Work on specific elements by these other initiatives, and indeed academic institutions such as the work undertaken by Hamburg University in Germany and at Princeton University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the US, as well as of course previous verification work undertaken by the IAEA, OPCW and US-Russia, are used by the groups within IPNDV enabling them to explore how these results fit into the wider nuclear disarmament picture, and identify remaining gaps and future areas of study. Importantly in the next few weeks the UN Group Of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification will meet here in Geneva. This group will provide a policy perspective on how verification can advance nuclear disarmament, further widening the number of States involved in this work. Further work on all aspects of verification are required, including technological, academic and policy orientated efforts. There is therefore plenty of room for not only the existing initiatives but for plenty more as well, so I encourage all of you, if you are not already, to become involved and help create the practical and effective verification solutions, which will enable the required confidence to be gained, in future nuclear disarmament.
Thank you.
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